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STS-131 
KSC S&MA 
8T8-130 Launch-On-Need (LON) Assessment 
LON Status GREEN II 
STS-132 is processing as the LON for STS-131 
• 8RB middle center sections are in work. 
• ET-136 mate is 3/29. 
• OV-104 processing in OPF-1 is on schedule with a Ready-to-Roll 
date of 4/13. 
• 88V Rollout to Pad-A: 4/20. 
• The Launch of 8T8-132 as LON would occur 39 days from the 
8T8-131 launch: 5/14. 
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RISK TYPE: 
HAZARD REPORTS: 
CRITICALITY: 
ORGANIZATION: 
TSM Bonnet Closure Timing 
Safety 
N/A 
N/A 
KSC S&MA 
RISK DESCRIPTION I STATEMENT: 
• STS-130 LH2 Bonnet closure timing was out of family fast (but within Spec.) at: 
1.121 seconds. 
• Expected range: approx 1.2 seconds 
• Specification range: 1.1 to 1.3 seconds 
• The 1.3 seconds is to ensure the bonnet is closed before the SSME nozzle exit plane 
passes the door at approx. 1.38 seconds to eliminate GSE damage 
• 1.1 seconds is to ensure bonnet does not contact umbilical and produce FOD 
• Concern: bonnet contacting carrier plate during closure if too fast (Bellow 1.1 Sec.) 
• Bonnet contacting Umbilical Carrier Plate during closure could generate FOD 
• Cause: Different lot of bonnet closure thrusters is providing more closing thrust 
• Inventory indicates that all Lot EAJ thrusters have been used and must now use Lot EAK 
thrusters for the TSM bonnet. 
• Consequences: 
• Catastrophic 
• RISK MITIGATION: 
• Install longer bonnet closure wires for MLP3 L02 and LH2 TSM to extend closing time by 70 
milliseconds and return to a nominal closure time of 1.2 seconds 
• CONSTRAINTS: None 
• S&MA RATIONALE & RECOMMENDATION: 
• Not a Constraint to flight 
• At worst, change will extend TSM bonnet closure time too much and damage GSE 
• Change will error on the side of not producing FOD 
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SAFETY RISK MATRIX 
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LC-39A High Pressure Gas Storage Facility 
(HPGF) Net Damage 
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RISK TYPE: L 
HAZARD REPORTS: I Probable K 
CRITICALITY: 
Safety 
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N/A E Infrequent 
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RISK DESCRIPTION I STATEMENT: 
• During STS-130 launch High Pressure Gas Facility (HPGF) netting was damaged due to plume pressures and heat radiation 
• Damage involved heat shrinkage and tearing of the netting during Space Shuttle lift-off; possible FOD concern 
• Consequence: Marginal 
BACKGROUND 
• HPGF netting was placed for the first time during STS-130 launch for 'extra' safety (area was already controlled properly) 
• Netting was intended to protect personnel working below from falling debris in the form of spalled concrete from the roof 
• Most probable cause of damage is attributed to lift-off plume pressures acting on sail-type netting coupled with radiant heat 
• Net damage most likely lasted for 3-5 seconds at lift-off (T +0 seconds) and as the vehicle cleared the tower at T +6 seconds 
• Net damage was observed in all six (6) cells of the High Pressure Gas Storage Facility 
RATIONALE I RECOMMENDATION 
• STS-131 and subsequent are safe to fly 
• Safety evaluated several risks affecting personnel working in the cells and tube tank equipment within cells ; all controlled properly 
• Risks due to concrete spalling from roof and SRB/SSME exhaust contacting ground support equipment were reviewed 
• Corrosion-induced concrete spalling is limited to 2"x2" only; occurs at random and not during lift-off 
• Review of launch videos showed no evidence of fire or direct plume impingement on the tanks; handrails on top show no damage 
• Thick tube banks likely experienced trans ient temperature excursions in the range of 200-220 degree F; not an issue 
• Corrective action: netting for STS-131 and subsequent launches will not be installed 
• Post-launch inspection and repairs have mitigated the problem; no large concrete pieces observed per EG&G 
• Tube banks show no flight damage experience since Apollo ; thick walls can sustain transient temperatures 
• Hard hat policy is in effect for all personnel entering controlled area within HPGF. 
• Netting was made of flame retardant material and was designed to deform rather than burn 
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TUBE TANK WITH TORN, 
DEFORMED NETTING 
ROOF CONCRETE 
SPALLING - TYPICAL 
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STS-130 Ice Detection Camera FOD concern 
Safety 
N/A 
N/A 
KSC S&MA 
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RISK DESCRIPTION I STATEMENT: 
o Improbable X 
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• If used improperly, ice detection equipment can liberate FOD during pre-launch ice inspections 
• Consequence: Marginal (after controls in place, catastrophic without controls due to FOD and personnel injury) 
BACKGROUND 
• During the STS-130 pre-launch ice inspections, an LCD readout screen from the prototype ice detection camera broke, liberating 
small pieces of glass on the 255' level of the fixed service structure 
• All FOD was collected prior to launch 
• A close call/mishap investigation was performed . The immediate cause was overpressure from the GN2 purge bottle. The root causes 
were determined to be procedural as well as operator error. 
RATIONALE I RECOMMENDATION 
• STS-131 and subsequent are safe to fly 
• KSC-PH has decided to never use the prototype equipment again 
for shuttle launches 
• The equipment is not required for ice inspections 
